31 iulie 2012 Scrie un comentariu
Am fost curios să văd și partea academică privind suspendările de președinți, cazul României din 2007 nu apare în reviste de specialitate relevante în exterior. În cazul altor ţări, explicaţiile merg de la fragilitatea coaliţiilor şi polarizare până la corupţie şi schimbarea centrului de greutate între puteri.
Young Hun K, Bahry D. Interrupted Presidencies in Third Wave Democracies. Journal Of Politics [serial online]. July 2008;70(3):807-822. Available from: Academic Search Alumni Edition, Ipswich, MA. Accessed July 30, 2012.
We began this essay with the question of what makes elected democratic presidents vulnerable to resignation or removal. Our results show that divided government and party fragmentation increase the potential for conflict. Many presidents manage to find accommodation with congress, but having fewer stable partisan resources in the legislature makes that less likely. Problems also seem to increase when the balance of power within government is skewed toward the chief executive.
Dual legitimacy plays an important role as well. As Linz noted, presidents can claim a countrywide mandate and thus may operate on the assumption that they command more national support than do MPs.
But a low first-round vote share for the president means a weaker base of initial support, one that may reduce deputies’ willingness to accede to the president’s agenda.
Overt public mobilization against a president is another major liability, demonstrating constituents’ unwillingness to sit by until the next election.
Acosta A, Polga-Hecimovich J. Coalition Erosion and Presidential Instability in Ecuador. Latin American Politics & Society [serial online]. Summer2011 2011;53(2):87-111. Available from: Academic Search Alumni Edition, Ipswich, MA. Accessed July 30, 2012.
Ecuador offers an ideal testing ground to assess the validity of these claims. Traditionally portrayed as a difficult nation to govern, given its high legislative fragmentation, the country underwent significant political reforms between 1995 and 1998 to improve the president’s ability to influence policies. Some of these reforms strengthened presidential rerogatives
to influence the legislative process through increased veto powers and gave the president greater powers to initiate “fast-track” legislation.
At the same time, reforms curbed the president’s ability to use and distribute available coalition incentives to legislative partners, including the ability to transfer budget allocations to friendly constituencies. As this study shows, even though constitutional reforms expanded the time horizons of legislative actors and the agenda-setting powers of the president, the scarcity of coalition incentives undermined the duration of government coalitions after 1996.
Hochstetler K. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy/Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America. Latin American Politics & Society [serial online]. Fall2008 2008;50(3):163-167. Available from: Academic Search Alumni Edition, Ipswich, MA. Accessed July 30, 2012.