25 noiembrie 2011 Scrie un comentariu
Mihaela Pană mi-a semnalat că tot apar prin presă interpretări, unele mai alarmiste decât altele, privind declarațiile președintelui rus Medvedev. Mai clar, președintele rus a exprimat intenția Rusiei de a amplasa sisteme de rachete în zona de contact cu NATO, ca reacție la decizia americană de a amplasa componenta europeană a sistemului de apărare anti-rachetă.
În plus, Mihaela a plusat, spunând că ar fi bine să dau și eu un comentariu la știre și eventual să spun ce cred despre cum, în ce măsură, asemenea interpretări jurnalistice la cald ar putea afecta securitatea națională.
Un comentariu îl scriu acum, la partea cu analiza legată de securitatea națională cred că voi scrie cu altă ocazie, deci nu mă eschivez doar că durează mai mult să prezint ceva relevant.
Să prezint faptele.
1. Pe 22 noiembrie- avem o decizie americană, comunicată aici de Victoria Neuland, Spokesperson la Departamentul de stat, dau doar un citat:
MS. NULAND: Statement is already out – there you go – advising that the U.S. has made a decision to cease implementing, vis-à-vis Russia, our – certain obligations under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. This move responds to Russia’s cessation of implementation of CFE, which began in December 2007, and the subsequent impasse with Moscow on a way forward.
As you know, we’ve made repeated efforts to bring Russia back to full implementation of CFE. Efforts were made in 2007. Efforts were made in 2009 and 2010. So what this means specifically is that the U.S. will not accept Russian inspections of our bases under the CFE, and we will also not provide Russia with the annual notifications and military data called for in the treaty. And it is our understanding that a number, if not all, of the U.S.-NATO allies will do the same. (Vezi punctul 3 mai jos)
QUESTION: Why is that a good thing?
MS. NULAND: Well, we have a treaty now that is not serving the purpose for which we signed, which was to provide military transparency among all the 30 states parties to the treaty, and to allow for reassurance. We have tried repeatedly to bring Russia back to the table, because we do believe in the CFE and we think it provides reassurance. But we’re at a stage now where, after a number of efforts to salvage this, we don’t think it’s in our interest to continue to provide data that is not reciprocated on the Russian side.
2. Pe 23 noiembrie- avem replica rusă, dată de președintele rus, aici, vă dau un citat cu ordinea pașilor aleși de Medvedev pentru a fi implementați cu evaluările mele:
In this connection, I have made the following decisions:
First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the missile attack early warning radar station in Kaliningrad on combat alert. -Postură pasivă, termen imediat/scurt, implementare probabilă.
Second, protective cover of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons will be reinforced as a priority measure under the programme to develop our air and space defences. – Postură pasivă, termen mediu, implementare probabilă.
Third, the new strategic ballistic missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be equipped with advanced missile defence penetration systems and new highly-effective warheads. Postură activă, termen lung. Postură activă, termen lung, implementare posibilă.
Fourth, I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defence system data and guidance systems if need be. These measures will be adequate, effective, and low-cost. - Postură activă, termen lung, implementare posibilă.
Fifth, if the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy modern offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the US missile defence system in Europe. One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad Region. Postură ofensivă, termen lung, implementare probabilă.
Other measures to counter the European missile defence system will be drawn up and implemented as necessary.
If the situation continues to develop not to Russia’s favour, we reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and arms control measures.
Besides, given the intrinsic link between strategic offensive and defensive arms, conditions for our withdrawal from the New START Treaty could also arise, and this option is enshrined in the treaty.